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Statements for the Confrontation Clause?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ohio v. Roberts' the Supreme Court held that the admission of hearsay
statements into evidence against a criminal defendant did not violate the
Confrontation Clause2 under two circumstances: when the statements were
within "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions, in which case the Court inferred
their reliability "without more", or when they otherwise indicated reliability
through "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 3 The Court in Roberts
focused on the trustworthiness of hearsay statements, stating that "augment[ing]
accuracy" 4 at trials was the underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause.5
A decade later, in Idaho v. Wright,6 the Court continued to rely on the holding
of the Roberts case7 in determining the admissibility of "firmly rooted" hearsay
statements under the Confrontation Clause and continued the Roberts' focus on
the trustworthiness of hearsay statements.8 Unfortunately, the Court still has
not defined which exceptions to the hearsay rule are "firmly rooted." 9 Further,
1 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
2 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ("[C]ertain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the
'substance of the constitutional protection.'" The Court mentioned dying declarations,
"cross-examined prior-trial testimony" and business and public records as potential "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions.).
4 Id. at 65.
5 Id. at 65-66 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 109 (1934), "Reflecting
[the Confrontation Clause's] underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding
process... the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that
'there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.'"; also quoting Mancusi
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972), "The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure
that there 'are indicia of reliability .... ' Dutton v. Evans [400 U.S. 74 (1970)] and to
'afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.'
California v. Green [399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)].").
6 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
7 Id. at 3147.
8 Id. at 3150.
9 Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Fimly Rooted".• Exceptions to the Confrontation
aus'e, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1, 3, 7, 12 (1987). In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987), the Court gave the unsatisfactory definition that a "firmnly rooted" hearsay exception
was one that has "a long tradition of being outside the compass of the general hearsay
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the trustworthiness of exceptions to the hearsay rule that may be called "firmly
rooted" is open to question.10 In judging the reliability of statements not falling
under "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions, however, the Wright case made a
significant change. The Court excluded the use of corroborating evidence in
determining the reliability of hearsay offered as evidence.In
This Comment questions the holding of the Court in the Wright case with
respect to the use of corroborating evidence. The holding conflicts with the
underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause, augmenting accuracy, as
defined by the Court in Roberts. Secondly, the undebated continuation in
Wright, in dicta, of the automatic admission into evidence of "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions also is challenged as this automatic admission conflicts with
the Confrontation Clause purpose of augmenting the accuracy of trials. In
combination, the Wright holding on the use of corroborating evidence and the
continued automatic admission into evidence of "firmly rooted" hearsay
exceptions raises a serious question as to whether the rules now governing the
admission of hearsay statements into evidence satisfy the purpose and spirit of
the Confrontation Clause. First, this Comment will examine the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause. Next, this Comment will examine the use of
corroboration in federal courts of appeals prior to Wright. Then, the Wright
case and its holding on corroboration will be examined. The continuing
presumption of reliability for "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions will then be
discussed. Finally, this Comment will support a return to the use of
corroboration in judging the reliability of hearsay evidence.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
While the origins and full intent of the Confrontation Clause may not be
clear, 12 the Court has suggested that the Confrontation Clause and the rules on
the admission of hearsay evidence both were based in the reaction to hearsay
abuses at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. 13 The Court asserts that the
Confrontation Clause now has an existence and purpose apart from that of the
exclusion." There are 37 hearsay exceptions listed in the Federal Rules of Evidence, but
which the court will ultimately determine to have had a long enough tradition to be "firmly
rooted" is unknown.
10 Goldman, supra note 9, at nn.60-100 and accompanying text; see infra notes 85-
100 and accompanying text.
11 Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150.
12 Randolph N. lonakait, Restoing the Confrontation Caause to the Sixth Amendnent,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 569 n.46 (1988); Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to
Hearsay Refonn, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 59 (1987); James W. Jennings, Note, Preserving
the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Crininal Trials, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 741,746-49 (1965).
13 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 n.16 (1970).
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hearsay rules. The Court has stated that while the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rules
are generally designed to protect similar values, it is a quite different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is
nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their
exceptions as they existed historically at common law.... [W]e have more
than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements
in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception. 14
In a discourse on the Confrontation Clause in California v. Green,15 the Court
noted "our own decisions seem to have recognized at an early date that it is the
literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of
the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause." 16
In Mattox v. United States, the Supreme Court had discussed the benefits
and intentions of the Confrontation Clause, holding the Clause's object
[is] to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness
in which the accused has an opportunity not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they may look at him and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether or not he is worthy of belief. 17
Similarly, more recently in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, the Court held that a
defendant could state a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that
he was "prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show.., bias on the part of the witness and thereby 'to expose to
the jury the facts from which the jurors . . . could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witnesses.'" 18
The Court's emphasis on cross-examination, reading literal confrontation
into the Confrontation Clause, has never prevented the Court from shifting its
focus when the need arose. Nearly a century ago, faced with the need to use
14 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970). For a view that the
Confrontation Clause has not been kept sufficiently separate from hearsay rules, see David
E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Cause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News and
Sore Bad News, 17 HOFsIRA L. REV. 51, 80 (1988) (suggesting that the hearsay rule and
its legislative exceptions threaten to engulf the constitutional right to confrontation).
is Green, 399 U.S. at 149.16 Id. at 157 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)).
17 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43.
18 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 539 (1974)); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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the statement of a witness who had died prior to the defendant's retrial, the
Court stated, "general rules of law of this kind [requiring confrontation],
however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of
the case." 19 The Court's focus would shift to identifying an underlying purpose
for the Confrontation Clause away from the emphasis on literal confrontation as
the manifestation of that purpose. In Roberts, the Supreme Court stated that
"augment[ing] accuracy" was the underlying purpose of the Confrontation
Clause.20 The Court has rephrased this statement of the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause in other cases, saying its purpose was to advance "the
accuracy of the truth determining process in criminal trials." 21 The Court in
Wright continued this focus on the reliability and trustworthiness of evidence
admitted as hearsay exceptions when addressing Confrontation Clause
concerns.
22
III. A REVIEW OF CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS CASES USING
CORROBORATION TO JUDGE THE RELIABILITY OF HEARSAY FOR
ADMISSION UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Wright, federal circuit courts
almost uniformly looked for corroboration when judging, for the Confrontation
Clause, the reliability of hearsay statements admitted under "non-firmly
rooted" exceptions. The First Circuit, in United States v. Fields,23 a case
involving statements against penal interest, did not decide whether
corroborating evidence was always needed to show reliability under the
Confrontation Clause, but in holding that the hearsay statement at issue was
reliable, did so at least partly because of the availability of corroborating
evidence.24 The Second Circuit, in United States v. Katsougrakis,25 held that a
19 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
20 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
21 See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (As noted in Jonakait, supra
note 12, at 576-77); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986); Tennessee v. Street,
471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 84 (1970)).
22 Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).
23 United States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir.), cert. dended, 493 U.S. 955
(1989). The cases involving statements against penal interest appearing in notes 20-55
generally did not consider these statements to be "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. The
courts looked for corroboration of the statements in order to judge reliability for the
Confrontation Clause.
24 See also United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1082 (1990) (corroboration was cited as one indicium of reliability).
25 United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (The court held that the declarant's nodding head indicated assertive
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statement against penal interest was a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, thus
reliable without a further showing of trustworthiness. However, the court noted
that corroborating circumstances confirmed their finding of trustworthiness for
the statement against penal interest for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Boyce,26 required the reliability of
hearsay statements to "be corroborated by the 'totality of circumstances' in the
case", examining "both the context in which the declaration was made, as well
as its content." The Third Circuit's decision to look beyond corroboration
alone relied upon their earlier decision in United States v. Bailey,27 in which
the court stated that "the trustworthiness of a statement should be analyzed by
evaluating not only the facts corroborating the veracity of a statement, but also
the circumstances in which the declarant made the statement and the incentive
he had to speak truthfully or falsely." The Boyce court finally rejected the use
of a statement against interest, largely due to the absence of reliability in the
circumstances of the making of the statement.28 The court noted the absence of
information in the record on the declarant's arrest and interrogation-during
which the statement was obtained-and the absence of anything in the record to
indicate that the statement was made with some purpose other than to curry
favor with authorities. 29 The court held, "[diespite the fact that the content of
[the declarant's] statement was corroborated by other evidence in the case, the
context in which the statement was given indicates that it was unreliable."30
The Third Circuit, though holding corroboration to be a necessary factor in
finding statements to be reliable for the Confrontation Clause, also looked to
additional factors to judge reliability.
The Fourth Circuit, in deciding Gregory v. North Carolind3t just months
before Idaho v. Wright, explicitly required contemporaneous corroboration for
the admission of a child's statement in a sexual abuse case. Finding no
contemporaneous corroboration of a disputed out of court statement made for
medical diagnosis, the court held the admission of the statement at the district
statements in response to questions. While the court held that a statement against penal
interest was a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, and therefore did not have to consider the
reliability of the hearsay statements further, it stated that "corroborating circumstances
confirm the trustworthiness of the statement." Among the corroborating evidence noted
were economic troubles, expert testimony indicating an intentionally set fire, and payment
for the setting of a fire. The corroboration noted was extrinsic to the making of the
statement.).
26 United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir. 1988) (Boyce's counsel had
objected at trial to the admission of a statement against interest made by a codefendant to
police while the codefendant was in custody on, inter alia, Confrontation Clause grounds).27 United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978).
28 Byce, 849 F.2d at 836.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 837.
31 900 F.2d 705, 706-08, 710 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990).
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court violated the Confrontation Clause and ordered a new trial. The court held
contemporaneous corroboration was "a requirement implicit in the Roberts
insistence on 'particularized' guarantees of reliability."32 In requiring extrinsic
corroboration, the court appeared to question whether statements made by
young children about sexual abuse could ever be intrinsically reliable. 33 United
States v. Smith, an earlier Fourth Circuit case, noted the role of corroboration
in establishing the reliability of a codefendant's statement in an arson
conspiracy case.34
The Fifth Circuit, in the pre-Ohio v. Roberts case of United States v.
Ward,35 found that strong corroboration alone was sufficient to supply the
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" needed for a residual
hearsay exception. Later, the Fifth Circuit required corroboration to support
the reliability of hearsay evidence for admission under the Confrontation
Clause. In United States v. Sarmiento-Perez,36 the Fifth Circuit declared that
when a party makes an inculpatory statement against his or her penal interest
the statement must be corroborated to meet the Confrontation Clause standard
for reliability. In United States v. Robinson,37 a Fifth Circuit case decided a
year after Sarmiento-Perez, the court required a declarant's inculpatory non-
custodial statement to be corroborated in order to be found trustworthy, though
it apparently contained no attempt to shift blame and was made voluntarily.
Thus, the court required corroboration even when a statement looked
intrinsically trustworthy. In United States v. Vernor,38 the court initially
mentioned the circumstances in which a statement against interest was made as
an indication of the statement's reliability, but went on to rely on corroboration
as the primary circumstance indicating reliability for the Confrontation Clause.
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Barlow,39 looked at corroborating
evidence, among other factors, in judging the reliability of grand jury
testimony challenged under the Confrontation Clause. The testimony in Barlow
3 2 Id. at 708.
33 Id. at 709 (The court held the child involved here was less likely to make a reliable
statement because she was bright, and so may have gotten information on which to base her
statement alleging sexual abuse from an outside source such as television.).
3 4 United States v. Smith, 792 F.2d 441, 443-44 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1037 (1987).
35 552 F.2d 1080, 1083 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 850 (1977).
36 633 F.2d 1092, 1098-1101 (5th Cir. 1980) (The Confrontation Clause issue was not
directly reached as the court held the evidence was too unreliable for admission even under
evidentiary principals.).
37 635 F.2d 363, 364 (5th Cir. 1981).
38 United States v. Vernor, 902 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 301 (1990) (The case involved the inculpatory statement of an accomplice which
incriminated the defendant also. Due to the incriminating portions of the statement the court
judged the reliability of the statement as "non-firmly rooted" evidence.).
39 693 F.2d 954, 965 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
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was admitted as hearsay evidence due to the declarant's unavailability after an
assertion of marital privilege. In Nelson v. Farrey,40 United States v. Snyder,
41
and United States v. Guinan,42 the Seventh Circuit considered corroboration,
among many other factors, in assessing the reliability of hearsay statements for
Confrontation Clause challenges. In 1990, the Seventh Circuit decided United
States v. Garcia,43 a case involving the admission of a codefendant's statement
against interest. The court indicated that the corroboration of a statement may
provide, on its own, a sufficient guarantee of the trustworthiness of the
statement for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court, however, did not
clearly indicate whether corroboration must be present in order for hearsay
statements to be judged trustworthy, or whether other factors could also
establish a statement's trustworthiness.
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Riley,44 held that corroboration was
needed for an inculpatory statement against interest in order for the statement to
show the reliability required by the Confrontation Clause. In United States v.
Roberts,45 the Eighth Circuit admitted a statement partly in reliance on the
degree of corroboration present, though the court looked at other factors
supporting reliability. The court questioned whether corroboration standing
alone would demonstrate the type of trustworthiness required by the
Confrontation Clause.46 Berrisford v. Wood47 involved Confrontation Clause
challenges to several hearsay exceptions: excited utterances, adoptive
admissions, and statements against penal interest. The court held all the hearsay
statements to be within "firmly rooted" exceptions (though it acknowledged
that adoptive admissions were not even hearsay, per se) and hence
presumptively reliable for Confrontation Clause purposes under the Roberts
rule. However, the court also held that as the statements were supported by
40 Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042
(1990) (statement made to a psychologist by the child-victim of a sexual assault).
41 872 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1989) (grand jury testimony admitted under a
residual hearsay exception).
42 836 F.2d 350, 358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988) (relying on United
States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982) (grand
jury testimony admitted under a residual hearsay exception)).
43 897 F.2d 1413, 1421 (7th Cir. 1990).
44 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981) (cases requiring corroboration of
inculpatory hearsay statements, to provide the "indicia of reliability" required by the
Confrontation Clause).
45 844 F.2d 537, 547 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988) (evidence admitted
under a residual hearsay exception).46 1d. at 546.
47 826 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1016 (1988); see also United
States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1445-47 (8th Cir. 1986) (dicta).
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corroborating evidence, they were supported by adequate indicia of reliability
even for "non-firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions under the Roberts rule.48
The Ninth Circuit, in Barker v. Morris,49 stated that "corroboration is a
recognized indicium of reliability in Confrontation Clause analysis." 50 The
Barker court, however, did not restrict the factors they could use in judging
trustworthiness, holding, "[t]he test... is whether the factors surrounding the
making of the out-of-court statement, taken as a whole, indicate
trustworthiness, not whether some mechanical list of factors indicating
reliability is met."51 In United States v. Marchini,52 the court referred to the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Barlow,53 and used corroboration to support the
reliability of a hearsay statement. In United States v. Candoli,54 which involved
an inculpatory statement against penal interest, the court held the presence of
corroborating evidence made the challenged statement reliable for the
Confrontation Clause.55 In United States v. Holland,56 another case involving
declarations against penal interest, the court held that circumstances must
indicate the reliability of hearsay exceptions in order for the hearsay evidence
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Among the circumstances the court looked
at was the presence of corroboration. In judging the reliability of a statement
the court used a balancing approach, looking at a variety of factors supporting
the reliability of the statement (corroboration, voluntariness and spontaneity
being some of the factors considered) and comparing these factors with factors
that tended to show a lack of reliability in the statement (such as evidence of an
attempt to curry favor or to shift blame and custodial detention when a
statement was made). 57 The balancing approach used by the Holland court to
judge the reliability of hearsay statements had been set forth earlier in the Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Layton (Layton 11).58 The Eleventh Circuit, in
48 Wood, 826 F.2d at 750-51.
49 761 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986) (citing United
States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978)
(evidence admitted under a residual hearsay exception)).
50 Id. at 1402.
51 Id. at 1403; see also United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir.
1982) (citing corroboration as a factor indicating reliability).
52 797 F.2d 759, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987) (grand
jury testimony).
53 United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1983).
54 870 F.2d 496, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1989).
55 Id. at 510 (note that the court also refused to decide whether a statement against
interest was a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule, and therefore within the
reliability presumption of Roberts).
56 880 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1989).
57 Id. at 1094.
58 855 F.2d 1388, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046 (1989).
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United States v. Capman, looked primarily, though not exclusively, to the
presence of corroborating evidence in judging the reliability of hearsay
evidence under a Confrontation Clause challenge. 59 The Qzpman court noted
they had relied upon corroboration in an earlier case in judging a statement's
reliability. 60
The cases discussed above show the circuit courts' considerable use of
corroboration, prior to Wright, in judging reliability for the Confrontation
Clause of hearsay evidence admitted under "non-firmly rooted" exceptions.
The Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts affirmatively required corroboration of
hearsay statements to satisfy the reliability requirement of the Confrontation
Clause. The other circuit courts discussed considered corroboration along with
other factors in judging the reliability of hearsay evidence. The courts may
have placed differing values upon corroboration's usefulness in judging
reliability in relation to other factors indicating reliability, but it is noteworthy
that all these courts did consider corroboration as a factor in assessing
reliability.
IV. IDAHO V. WRIGHT
Idaho v. Wright involved a criminal charge of lewd conduct with a minor,
brought against the child's parents.61 The trial court concluded that the two-
and-a-half-year-old daughter involved was incapable of testifying at trial, and
statements she had made to a pediatrician were admitted under Idaho's residual
hearsay exception. 62 The victim's father, Giles, challenged the admission of the
doctor's testimony under Idaho's residual exception, but the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld his conviction.63 The victim's mother, Wright, challenged her
conviction as a violation of the Confrontation Clause, and the Idaho Supreme
Court reversed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that a lack of
procedural safeguards for the doctor's interview, particularly the lack of a tape
recording of the interview which the defense could review, indicated a lack of
the "particularized guarantees" of trustworthiness needed to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. The court stated that "[t]he circumstances surrounding
this interview demonstrate dangers of unreliability which, because the interview
5 9 United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 932 (1989) (The statement by the defendant's wife to police, which implicated the
defendant in a bank robbery, was admitted under a residual exception.).
6 0 Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984) (The court examined the
admission of a res gestae statement, in spite of res gestae being a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception.).
61 Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3143 (1990).
62 Id. at 3144.
63 State v. Giles, 772 P.2d 191, 195 (Idaho 1989).
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was not recorded, can never be fully assessed." 64 The Supreme Court of Idaho
also expressed concern with what they believed to be leading questions and
with their perception that the interviewer had a preconceived idea of what the
child would be disclosing. 65 The court looked for "particularized guarantees"
of trustworthiness only in the actual making of the statement. 66
The United States Supreme Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for a five
justice majority, upheld the lower court's finding of a Confrontation Clause
violation.67 The Court started by restating its holding in Ohio v. Roberts68 that
the Confrontation Clause prevents statements from being admitted under
exceptions to the hearsay rule unless the statements bear adequate indicia of
reliability. The Court reasoned that the necessary indicia of reliability is met
when the statement falls under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, 69 but said
that statements outside of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions were
"presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause
purposes... and must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." 70 The Court held that a Confrontation Clause
violation existed, not due to the lack of procedural safeguards that the Idaho
Supreme Court noted, but rather due to a lack of intrinsic reliability in the
making of the hearsay statement admitted into evidence.71
A. Wright's Holding on Corroboration
The significance of the Wright case lies in the Court's holding that
evidence corroborating a hearsay statement could not be used to support the
needed finding of trustworthiness for Confrontation Clause purposes. The
Court said that it wanted to bar the "admission of a presumptively unreliable
statement, by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial." 72
To avoid bootstrapping of evidence, the Court held: "Thus, unless an
affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was
made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is
64 State V. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Idaho 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990);
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
65 Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3145.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 3153. Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens
and Scalia. Joining Justice Kennedy in dissent were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White
and Blackmun.
68 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56.
69 Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146.
70 Id. at 3148 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) and Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66).
71 Id. at 3148-49.
72 1d. at 3150.
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not worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of
the out-of-court statement." 73
The Supreme Court limited the admission of hearsay to evidence
possessing "indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not
by reference to other evidence at trial." 74 The Court reasoned that
corroboration might be limited in its scope but may be accepted by a jury as
corroboration of the truth of the entire statement at issue.75 The Court would
limit the use of corroborating evidence to indicating whether the admission of a
hearsay statement may have been harmless error.76
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, challenged the Court's restrictions on the use
of corroboration to support the trustworthiness of statements for the
Confrontation Clause. He noted the daughter's statements were corroborated in
at least four respects:
(1) physical evidence that she was the victim of sexual abuse; (2) evidence that
she had been in the custody of the suspect at the time the injuries occurred; (3)
testimony of the older daughter that their father abused the younger
daughter... and, (4) the testimony of the older daughter that she herself was
abused by their father.77
Justice Kennedy urged that corroboration be considered together with the
circumstances surrounding the making of a statement when judging the
reliability of admitted hearsay statements for the Confrontation Clause.
B. Wright Does Not Increase the Reliability of Hearsay Statements
Admitted Into Evidence
The Wright case, in continuing the Roberts presumption of reliability for
statements falling under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, 78 continues to
admit statements that may not be trustworthy79 only because they fall within
the realm of a "firmly rooted" evidentiary exception for hearsay. Wright, by
preventing the consideration of corroborating evidence, also has eliminated a
useful tool for scrutinizing the truthfulness of evidence sought to be admitted
under a "non-firmly rooted" hearsay exception. If increasing the
trustworthiness of statements admitted into evidence is the purpose the Court
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 3151.
76 Id. at 3150-51.
77 Id. at 3156.
78 Id. at 3147; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
79 See infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
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intends to define for the Confrontation Clause,80 it is questionable whether the
Court's holdings have been helpful.
V. THE UNRELIABILITY OF FIRMLY ROOTED EXCEPTIONS
A. The Presunption of Reliability for Firnly Rooted Hearsay Exceptions
In Ohio v. Roberts,8' the Court ruled that the reliability of a hearsay
statement could be inferred without further support if the evidence fell within a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception.82 The Court cited the "truism" that hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values, in supporting its uncritical admission into evidence of certain hearsay
exceptions as "comport[ing] with the 'substance of the constitutional
protection.'" 8 3
In Wright, the Court continued without debate this automatic acceptance of
"firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions as reliable, reasoning that the preference
was warranted by "the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative
experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court
statements." 8 4 The Court's generous deference to legislative enactment and
court experience in admitting "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions has resulted
in a mechanical rule. If a statement is labeled "firmly rooted," it is presumed to
be in conformity with the Confrontation Clause, and is generally admitted
without further consideration of its reliability. When a statement is labeled as
"non-firmly rooted," admission is conditioned on further indicia of reliability.
Labeling takes the place of individual consideration of each statement's
reliability. Mechanical application of any rule prevents the consideration of any
special circumstances that may be present in the matter at hand. A mechanical
rule has advantages in that it is easy to apply, predictable, and less susceptible
to an abuse of discretion;85 however, the application of a mechanical rule to a
constitutional right may occasionally promote injustice.
It is surprising that a Court which has stated, "where constitutional [due
process] rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice," 86
80 Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150.
81 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
82 Id. at 66 (It is also worthwhile to note again that the Court gave examples of "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions, then and since, but they have failed to define or delineate
exactly which hearsay exceptions are "firmly rooted").
83 ld. (citation omitted).
84 Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147.
85 See generally, George C. Christie, An Esay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE LJ. 747;
Ronald M. I)workin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. C. L. REv. 14 (1967).
86 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
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continues to allow a mechanical presumption of reliability for "firmly rooted"
hearsay statements. This willingness of the Wright Court to continue a
mechanical presumption of reliability for "firmly rooted" hearsay statements is
also internally inconsistent with their unwillingness to form mechanical tests to
determine the trustworthiness of "non-firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. 87
Admission of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions only because of past practice,
without giving real consideration to the reliability of the statements for the
Confrontation Clause, is not only weak constitutional analysis and
interpretation but in the case of some "firmly rooted" exceptions also difficult
to defend on a logical basis. Statements made under "firmly rooted" hearsay
exceptions can be as untrustworthy as any other hearsay statement.88
Exceptions rooted in the past89 can provide custom or practice to follow, but
age alone does not assure reliability. The two examples of "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions that follow serve to illustrate the potential unreliability
resulting from a mechanical admission of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions.
1. Dying Declarations
Dying declarations are mentioned in Roberts as being a "firmly rooted"
exception. 90 However, McCormick states, "[t]he doctrine relating to dying
declarations is the most mystical in its theory and traditionally the most
arbitrary in its limitations." 91 Common law presumed that "No person, who is
immediately going into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon
his lips." 92 The common law exception for dying declarations rests on a
number of untenable assumptions. The doctrine assumes that all persons
believe in a Maker93 and in punishment for "sin"; assumes the declarant is
virtuous or sufficiently wary of punishment in an afterlife that he will abstain
from harming his enemies one last time before dying; and assumes that persons
speak coherently and rationally when facing death. The exception was adopted
by the Federal Rules of Evidence even though the advisory comin'ttee note
mentions that "the original religious justification for the exception may have
lost its conviction ... over the years." The Advisory Committee noted that "it
can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures are present." 94
87 Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3148-50.
8 8 Goldman, spra note 9, at 16-25 nn.60-100 and accompanying text.
89 As an example, Goldman, supra note 9, notes that the exception for dying
declarations "dates back as far as the first half of the 1700s." Id. at 24.
90 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980).
912 MCCORMCK ON EIDENcE § 309 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
92 Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881), quoted in
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990).
93 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 91, § 309; Goldman, supra note 9, at 1.
9 4 FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
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Realistically there is a "probability that the declarant will have been under great
stress before, during and after the homicidal attack [or other cause of
impending death]", but rather than advancing accuracy, "[s]tress... interferes
with accurate perception and can lead to memory or narration problems." 95
The admission of dying declarations rests on an illogical and unsupportable
proposition that the statements of persons facing death, those persons most
likely to be in fear, anguish, and a state of confusion, are somehow likely to be
more truthful and accurate than the statement of a person who speaks calmly or
with time for reflection.96
2. Statements Against Interest
An exception that has been considered firmly rooted by some lower
courts97 offers another example of the inherent untrustworthiness of some
"firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. The premise of allowing statements against
interest is that "persons do not make statements which are damaging to
themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true."98 The Advisory
Committee proposing Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b), to admit statements
against interest, would have broadly defined statements that were against the
interest of the declarant, expanding the scope of the definition to its "full
logical limit." 99 The Advisory Committee would have included declarations
95 RICHARD 0. LEIPERT & STEPHEN SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 483 (2d ed. 1982).
96 See generally, Goldman, supra note 9, at 24-26. Similarly, spontaneous statements
and excited utterances may be admitted as forms of res gestae (in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, an exception is provided to the hearsay rule in FED. R. EVID. 803(2)). The
admission of these statements rests on the same general proposition that excitement will
somehow bring about more reliable statements then those statements coming after calm
reflection. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 91, § 268. The presumption of enhanced
reliability may be similarly attacked, see, e.g., I. Daniel Stewart, Perception, Memory, and
Hearsay: A Cnticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970
UTAH L. REV. 1.
97 See, e.g., United States v Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 775-76 (2d Cir.) (statement
against penal interest), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1983); United States v. Peacock, 654
F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981) (statement against penal interest); United States v. West, 574
F.2d 1131, 1138 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989)
(statement against penal interest); see also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 551-52 and n.4
(1980) (Blackmun, I., dissenting) ("The hearsay exception for declarations against interest is
firmly estabished.... The old view that the interest must be proprietary or pecuniary, not
penal,... has been fully discredited.... The rationale for allowing admission of
declarations against interest applies no less forcefully when the declarant concedes criminal
instead of civil liability.").
98 FED. R. EVID. 804 (b)(3) advisory committee's note.
9 9 Id.
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that exposed the maker to tort liability, hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, among
other declarations that have been retained in the rule of evidence. °0 Misgivings
over statements against interest as a general hearsay exception arose in the
Advisory Committee itself. The Committee had expressed concern about the
possibility of statements being made to "curry favor" with authorities. 10 1 This
concern immediately brings into question the central premise of the exception,
that persons will not make statements damaging to themselves unless they are
true. The concern over statements made to "curry favor" acknowledges that
persons may make untrue statements, even ones harmful to themselves, if they
believe they may escape a greater harm or gain other benefits which they
desire.
It may be very difficult to decide which statements were made
predominantly to "curry favor" with authorities, as opposed to statements made
without this desire for benefit. The House Judiciary Committee rejected the
Advisory Committee's recommendation to accept statements exposing the
maker to hatred, ridicule, or disgrace as being as reliable as those made against
the maker's financial or penal interests, and eliminated these statements from
the rule's coverage. 102 The House Judiciary Committee's decision impliedly
acknowledges that all statements against interest are not uniformly trustworthy:
community scorn will not prevent lies, but prison or financial loss will.
Mechanical compartmentalization of this nature is of limited usefulness in
predicting the reliability of statements against interest as it does not address the
values different persons put on different types of sanctions. In Lee v. Illinois,0 3
the Supreme Court rejected the reliability of at least one type of statement
against interest, confessions which implicate codefendants, calling them
presumptively unreliable. In this case, the Court noted the possible motive of
the declarant to spread the blame to mitigate the appearance of his own
culpability or to overstate the codefendant's involvement in retaliation for the
co-defendant having implicated the declarant in murder. 10 4 The Court noted the
reality that "once partners in crime recognize that the 'jig is up,' they tend
to... immediately become antagonists." 10 5
The Court's holding leaves in doubt what statements against interest, if
any, are still firmly rooted, and which of such statements can be considered
trustworthy. The two examples noted above of "firmly rooted" hearsay
exceptions, both of which are mechanically admitted into evidence, serve to
illustrate the unreliability inherent in allowing a rule to mechanically govern the
admission of evidence. While many "firmly rooted" hearsay statements
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 FED. R. Ev. 804 (b)(3) House Judiciary Committee Report, no. 93-650.
103 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
1 04 Id. at 544.
105 Ia. at 544-45.
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admitted into evidence may indeed be reliable, the mechanical approach to
these exceptions established by the Roberts Court allows the admission of some
hearsay statements which may be highly unreliable. Similarly, Wright's flat
rejection of the use of corroborating evidence in judging the reliability of "non-
firmly rooted" exceptions increases the risk of unreliable evidence being
admitted into evidence and of reliable evidence being barred.
VI. THE USE OF CORROBORATING EVIDENCE TO SHOW THE
RELIABILITY OF HEARSAY
It can be argued that all hearsay, whether arbitrarily classified as coming
under a "firmly rooted" exception or not, should be equally suspected as being
of questionable reliability. 1°6 The Supreme Court in the Roberts and Wright
line of cases chooses to look more carefully at hearsay evidence sought to be
admitted under a "non-firmly rooted" exception, requiring a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in the making of the statement for
the Confrontation Clause.'0 7 It is illogical for the Court to continue to carve
out a large group of statements for exemption from a determination of
reliability-statements falling within a "firmly rooted" exception-if the Court
believes looking at the circumstances of a statement's making generally is
needed to judge the statement's reliability. Presuming the reliability of "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions prevents the examination of this evidence on an
individual basis. Hearsay falling under the label of "firmly rooted" is not a
monolithic or static group; certainly not all "firmly rooted" hearsay admitted
will be equally reliable and different courts may label different types of hearsay
as "firmly rooted." "[N]ot all statements admissible under a particular hearsay
exception... possess the same degree of trustworthiness and reliability." 10 8
Since a mechanical presumption prevents a court from using its discretion and
from critically examining the evidence in each case, such a presumption should
be disfavored for determining reliability for the Confrontation Clause.'0 9
It is likewise illogical for the Court to remove a potentially valuable tool
for determining the reliability of "non-firmly rooted" hearsay. Were all
statements to be subject to close scrutiny, in order to advance accuracy in the
truth-determining process in trials, corroboration should surely be available for
use in the process. Prior to Wright, the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals'10 had accepted the value of corroboration in judging the reliability of
106 See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
107 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (if the hearsay does not fall within a
"firmly rooted" exception, reliability must be supported by a showing of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness"); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147-49 (1990).
108 Goldman, supra note 9, at 44 n.184.
109 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (1980).
110 See supra notes 23-60 and accompanying text.
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hearsay for the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court had said the use of
corroboration was a "traditional means of assessing accuracy."111 The Court
has cited corroboration as an indicium of the reliability of hearsay evidence in
Chambers v. Mississippi,n 2 0 z v. New York,113 and Parker v. Randolph.114
In Parker v. Randolph, the Court said, "Conceivably, cor-
roborating... circumstances surrounding otherwise inadmissible hearsay may
so enhance its reliability that its admission in evidence is justified in some
situations."" s In Bourlaily v. United States, the Court commented that "a piece
of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when
corroborated by other evidence." 116 In light of the wide recognition of the
value of corroboration in the past, the Court's limited explanation for the
removal of corroboration as a tool is disappointing. The Court, for example,
noted that a statement which was supported by some corroborating evidence
could still be a false statement, prompted by duress at the time of the making of
the statement.1 17 The Court, however, failed to consider the inverse possibility,
that a statement not supported by circumstances indicating reliability in the
making of the statement could still be a true statement, revealed as such by an
abundance of corroborating evidence available.
Further, the Court offered insufficient support for its holding barring the
use of corroboration. In looking at "non-firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions, or
any evidence, corroboration of the evidence intuitively would seem to be a
valuable factor to consider in judging the reliability of the evidence. Justice
Kennedy, writing in support of the use of corroboration in Wright, said that
"[i]t is a matter of common sense for most people that one of the best ways to
determine whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is
corroborated by other evidence." 118  "[Ujnlike other indicators of
111 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
112 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973).
113 481 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1987) (The Court specifically stated corroboration was
useful in judging the reliability of evidence, as opposed to limiting its use to judging the
weight of the evidence stating: "[The 'interlocking' nature of the codefendant's confession
pertains to... not its hannfidness but rather its reliability.").
114 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
115 Id. at87.
116 Bouraly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 (1987); see also Lee v. Illinois, 476
U.S. 530, 554-57 (1986) (Blackmun, I., dissenting) (He noted corroboration, in this case
physical evidence and a confession by the petitioner which mirrored the statement against
penal interest at issue, as an indicator of reliability. Then-Justice Rehnquist joined in this
dissent. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist also dissented in Wright.); Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 88, 91 (1970) (plurality); see generally, Jay L. Hack, Note, Declarations Against
Penal Interest: Standards of Aznirsibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U. L.
REV. 148, 176 (1975) (noting the value of corroboration as an indicator of reliability).
117 Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).
118 Id. at 3153 (Kennedy, L, dissenting).
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trustworthiness, corroborating evidence can be addressed by the defendant and
assessed by the trial court in an objective and critical way.""19 In Wright, the
Court holds that the truth of a statement is best judged from the circumstances
in which it was made.120 Even assuming that this is true, the Court did not
need to go beyond this to bar altogether the use of corroborating evidence in
the determination. If the majority in Wright saw a need for increased reliance
on some tools for determining reliability, this should not have required the
exclusion of other valid tools. Emphasis on the circumstances of the making of
a statement should not prevent consideration of corroborating evidence.
Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Wright, commented that the Court's
apparent misgivings about the weight to be given to corroborating evidence did
not "justify the wholesale elimination of this evidence from consideration, in
derogation of an overwhelming judicial and legislative consensus to the
contrary." 121 For example, after Wright, in cases in which the motives of a
declarant in making a statement are suspect, limiting consideration to the
circumstances of the making of the statement may bar the admission of a
statement even though corroborating evidence shows the statement to have been
unquestioningly reliable. If augmenting accuracy is the underlying purpose of
the Confrontation Clause, factors surrounding the making of a statement should
not even be of concern to a court once the objective truth is arrived at by any
means. In some cases, corroboration may provide the best means for arriving at
the truth. As Justice Kennedy says in his dissent in Wright:
If the Court means to suggest that the circumstances surrounding the making of
a statement are the best indicators of reliability, I doubt this is so in every
instance. And if this were true in a particular case, that does not warrant
ignoring other indicators of reliability such as corroborating
evidene ... unlike other indicators of trustworthiness, corroborating evidence
can be addressed by the defendant and assessed by the trial court in an
objective and critical way. 122
VII. CONCLUSION
Hard questions on the desirability of admitting certain hearsay statements
into evidence, under federal rules and the Confrontation Clause, pose a major
challenge to courts who must create rules that will advance the cause of justice
in trials. The volumes of writing on the topic of hearsay convinces a reader that
"no rule will perfectly resolve all possible problems." 123 As any new rule is
119 Id. at 3156.
12 0 Ild. at 3150.
121 ld. at 3154 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 3156 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1988).
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likely to present new problems, the Court is understandably reluctant to make
any major revision. Regarding the Confrontation Clause, the Court previously
has said that it "reject[s] the invitation to overrule a near-century of
jurisprudence. [The Court's] reluctance to begin anew is heightened by... the
Court's demonstrated success in steering a middle course among proposed
alternatives." 124 The holding in Wright, by eliminating the use of corroborating
evidence that had been accepted by most courts, made a major revision in the
way that the reliability of evidence is judged for the Confrontation Clause. In
Wright, the Court did not steer the middle course. The Court could have
expressed a preference for the consideration of factors related to the making of
hearsay statements over corroboration in judging the trustworthiness of
statements for the Confrontation Clause, without eliminating the use of
corroboration entirely. As corroboration is potentially a valuable aid in
determining reliability in some situations, and one which many courts had used
and trusted prior to Wright,125 the Court should consider limiting the holding
of Wright or reversing it.
Greg B. Schwab
124 1&
125 See upra notes 23-60 and accompanying text.
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